Towards Reducing the Attack Surface of Software Backdoors
Felix Schuster, Thorsten Holz
20th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), Berlin, November 2013
Backdoors in software systems probably exist since the very first access control mechanisms were implemented and they are a well-known security problem. Despite a wave of public discoveries of such backdoors over the last few years, this threat has only rarely been tackled so far.
In this paper, we present an approach to reduce the attack surface for this kind of attacks and we strive for an automated identification and elimination of backdoors in binary applications. We limit our focus on the examination of server applications within a client-server model. At the core, we apply variations of the delta debugging technique and introduce several novel heuristics for the identification of those regions in binary application that backdoors are typically installed in (i.e., authentication and command processing functions). We demonstrate the practical feasibility of our approach on several real-world backdoors found in modified versions of the popular software tools ProFTPD and OpenSSH. Furthermore, we evaluate our implementation not only on common instruction set architectures such as x86/x64, but also on commercial off-the-shelf embedded devices powered by a MIPS32 processor.[PDF]